Leaked Classified US Documents Mention Israeli Nuclear Weapons; This mention is a Gigantic Problem because of US Law

Hal Turner World October 24, 2024 Hits: 24612

Israel has been forced to delay a potential retaliatory attack on Iran after details of the planning were leaked from the US, Britain’s The Times newspaper reported Thursday.

According to the report, citing an unnamed intelligence source with knowledge of Israeli deliberations, Israel is worried that even though no potential targets were named in the leak, the details provided could help Iran predict certain patterns of attack.

The Times said Israel has developed an alternative plan but needs to war-game it before proceeding.

“The leak of the American documents delayed the attack due to the need to change certain strategies and components,” the source said. “There will be a retaliation, but it has taken longer than it was supposed to take.”

"Nuclear Weapons"

That's not the only problem with the Leaked Classified Documents. As shown on the leaked, CLASSIFIED "TOP SECRET" Document below, the red-squared text mentions "No sign of Israel intending to use nuclear weapons" (on Iran.)

The United States is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. U.S. Law - forbids the supplying of weapons to any country which violates the non-proliferation Treaty; whether those countries have signed it or not. Israel has not signed that Treaty.

By mentioning nuclear weapons in the Classified, TOP SECRET Document above, the United States has admitted it already knows Israel actually HAS nuclear weapons. The US is therefore FORBIDDEN to supply any weapons to Israel.

It is, as most folks know, the U.S. that has been supplying Israel with the weapons being used to Bomb Gaza, and now, to bomb Lebanon.

The U.S. appears then to be violating its own laws, by supplying weapons to a state it KNOWS has nuclear weapons, which is a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

If another country which signed the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty were to file suit in US federal Courts, to enforce the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty UPON THE U.S., that other country could get the U.S. Courts to ORDER a halt to the supplying of U.S. weapons to Israel.

Pursuant to the US Constitution Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution:

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

More importantly, it explicitly binds judges to follow it.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been signed by 191 states, with four countries remaining outside of the treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan. The five countries that are recognized as nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the treaty are: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States.

So because 191 countries are signers of that Treaty, any of them have "Legal Standing" to file suit to enforce the Treaty.

For instance, Lebanon signed the Treaty and, since Lebanon is presently under Israeli attack wherein Israel is using American-supplied weapons, Lebanon HAS legal standing to sue, and block all US Weapons shipments to Israel, based on the US Classified, TOP SECRET Document which mentions Israel nuclear weapons!!

Lebanon should hire a US Law Firm and sue in federal court for immediate relief on an Emergent basis.

If the flow of weapons to Israel is cut off, the attacks upon Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, will stop.

U.S. Nonproliferation Sanctions Laws

The United States has a variety of nonproliferation sanctions laws designed to dissuade foreign countries and companies from engaging in activities that contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in violation of the range of commitments enumerated above.

If reliable information indicates that activities that would trigger these sanctions have occurred, the president is required to make a determination; the president does not have discretion to simply decline to implement these sanctions laws. If a non-nuclear-weapon state were to acquire a nuclear weapon, the most relevant laws would include:

Glenn Amendment (22 USC 2799aa-1(b)): The Glenn Amendment cuts off a wide range of assistance and trade to any non-nuclear-weapon state that the president determines: received a nuclear explosive device; detonated a nuclear explosive device (even with a very low nuclear yield); or sought and received design information or components for the development of such a device. The sanctions are as follows:

termination of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, except for humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural commodities;
termination of defense sales and licensing of Munitions List exports;
termination of foreign military financing;
denial of U.S. government credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance (except for medical and humanitarian assistance and agricultural exports from the United States);
U.S. government opposition to any loan or financial or technical assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs);
prohibition of any loan or credit from U.S. banks to the foreign government (except for the purchase of food or other agricultural commodities); and
prohibition under the Export Administration Act of exports to that state of specific goods and technology licensed by the Commerce Department (except for food and other agricultural commodities).

The Glenn Amendment has no waiver provision for detonation or receipt of a nuclear explosive device. Congress would have to enact new legislation authorizing the president to waive some or all of these sanctions. (For transfers of design information or components, the president may waive if “the application of such sanctions against such country would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests.”)

Arms transfer sanction: The Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2753(f)) bans sales or leases of defense articles to any country that the president determines has materially breached binding commitments to the United States under international agreements concerning nonproliferation of nuclear explosive devices and unsafeguarded special nuclear material. There is no waiver provision. (This sanction does not ban munititions list licenses for nongovernmental sales.)

Foreign assistance sanction: No U.S. assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act may be provided to any non-nuclear-weapon state that the president determines has terminated, abrogated, or materially violated its full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA or materially violated its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States (22 USC 2429a-2). The president may waive if terminating assistance “would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.”

Nuclear Cooperation sanction (Section 129 of Atomic Energy Act, 42 USC 2158): No nuclear materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology may be exported to a non-nuclear-weapon state that the president determines has:

“detonated a nuclear explosive device”;
terminated, abrogated, or materially violated IAEA safeguards;
“engaged in activities involving source or special nuclear material and having direct significance for the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices” (unless the president finds that the state has made sufficient progress toward terminating such activities); or
materially violated its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.

The sanction may be waived if the president determines that “cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.”

Export-Import Bank sanction (12 USC 635(b)(4)): The Export-Import Bank “shall not give approval to guarantee, insure, or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to any country” if the secretary of state determines that:

the country materially violated, abrogated, or terminated IAEA safeguards;
the country materially violated, abrogated, or terminated any guarantee or undertaking in a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S.: or
the country is a non-nuclear-weapon state and detonated a nuclear explosive device.

The president may waive on national interest grounds. It is notable that Export-Import Bank financing has underwritten sales of commercial airlines to some U.S. allies and nuclear reactor exports by U.S. allies to third countries, just to cite a few examples.

ENR Transfer sanctions: No economic or military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act to any country the president determines has transferred or received nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology. The president may waive for reprocessing transfers if cessation of assistance “would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security” (22 USC 2799aa-1(a). The president may waive for enrichment transfers if cessation of assistance “would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S. interests” and the president has “received assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so” (22 USC 2799aa).

Discretionary sanctions (Executive Order 12938, as amended): The secretaries of state and treasury have discretionary authority to impose significant sanctions on any person or entity that contributes to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. These sanctions are not mandatory and do not apply to a country or government as a whole.

Scenarios Triggering U.S. and International Sanctions

If a non-nuclear-weapon state decided to pursue development of a nuclear weapon, the legal consequences would vary depending on the activities it undertook. Several possible scenarios are discussed below: withdrawal from the NPT and full-scope safeguards; manufacture of nuclear weapons, with or without imported nuclear weapons technologies; and detonation of a nuclear weapon or receipt of a nuclear weapon from another country.

Withdrawal from the NPT and Full-Scope Safeguards

A state might attempt to “legally” pursue nuclear weapons by exercising the withdrawal provision in the NPT. The NPT provides for withdrawal upon three months advance notice to all other parties and the UN Security Council. The international community would have three months to respond to an announcement of withdrawal. During that time, the non-nuclear-weapon state would continue to be bound by its NPT and safeguards obligations. After three months, the state would no longer be bound by its NPT commitments, which would also terminate its IAEA safeguards agreements.

UN Security Council: In the past, the UN Security Council has actively sought to dissuade states from violating or withdrawing from their NPT obligations, including by the imposition of international sanctions. If members of the UN Security Council were to pursue such sanctions, the withdrawing state would run the risk that the permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) would refuse to veto such sanctions.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: The NSG Guidelines provide that “Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear weapon State only when the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities” (see INFCIRC 254/Rev.14/Part 1). Only India is excepted from this policy, and this exception was adopted only after a heavy, sustained lobbying effort by the United States Accordingly, NSG members that followed the guidelines would cease the export of trigger list materials, equipment, and technology to the non-nuclear-weapon state after withdrawal from full-scope safeguards, which could have implications for nuclear fuel supply contracts on which the state relies for its nuclear energy program.

U.S. sanctions: Withdrawal from the NPT and full-scope safeguards would have direct sanctions consequences under U.S. law. In addition, if the withdrawing state had a 123 agreement with the United States, it would violate commitments to maintain full-scope safeguards (if they are non-nuclear-weapon states).^[1] Note that the following sanctions would apply even if the non-nuclear-weapon state never followed up with actual nuclear weapons activities.

Arms transfer sanction: No sales or leases of defense articles, with no waiver provision.

Export-Import Bank credit: No bank support for exports to that country. The president could waive this ban in whole or in part.

Nuclear cooperation: Termination of nuclear cooperation. The president could waive in whole or in part.

Right of return: The United States could exercise the right of return of any supplied items or materials.

Foreign assistance: No foreign assistance. The president could waive in whole or in part.

Manufacture of a Nuclear Weapon

If the non-nuclear-weapon state seeking nuclear weapons did not withdraw from the NPT and IAEA safeguards, it would violate those obligations when it began taking steps toward manufacturing a nuclear weapon.

Specifically, the non-nuclear-weapon state would trigger sanctions once it removed nuclear material from IAEA safeguards. It might also trigger sanctions if it embarked on construction of uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities without providing design information to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol. The state might seek to avoid the safeguards violation by providing the required design information, and it might even seek to conduct enrichment or reprocessing under safeguards until it had produced enough fissile material for a weapon. Enriching uranium to weapons grade and/or separating plutonium would not violate safeguards per se, but such activities would almost certainly be viewed by the international community as a prelude to nuclear weapons development.

UN Security Council: The UN Security Council would almost certainly condemn and might well impose sanctions on a non-nuclear-weapon state for such activities.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Some (and perhaps all) NSG members would cease exporting trigger list items and technology to that country.

U.S. sanctions: These activities would violate the country’s obligations to the United States under the NPT (if it failed to withdraw first) and under any 123 agreement.